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introduCtion
For over 150 years, India has engaged in arbitration following the 
introduction of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859 which came into 
effect with its chapter on arbitration. However, the concept of interna-
tional commercial arbitration (“ICA”) was then unknown. ICA first 
assumed significance in India due to the globalization and liberalization 
of the economy—the resulting phenomenal growth of commerce and 
industry—of the late twentieth century. Indeed, the Arbitration Act of 
1940, which governed the field for nearly half a century, did not include 
provisions for ICA. The Act of 1940 was then replaced by a new legisla-
tion in 1996, with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act of 1996 has subsequently been enacted with the 
hope of giving a new face to arbitration so that it does not replicate 
the civil courts, which suffer from the huge backlog of cases. Since the 
enactment of the present legislation, there has been a rise in ICA in the 
country. With the opening of foreign direct investment, the Indian legal 
system has been increasingly gaining momentum in ICA proceedings. 
1  Assistant Professor of Law and Executive Director, Centre for Advanced Research 
& Training in Arbitration Law, National Law University Jodhpur, India.
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Besides being a major investment destination, there has also been a vis-
ible trend of greater participation by India in the global economy.
Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996—mirrowing 
the jurisprudence fo the UNCITRAL Model Law (Model Law)—makes 
detailed provisions relating to both domestic arbitration and interna-
tional commercial arbitration. The law makes it clear that “notwithstand-
ing anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in 
matters relating to all kinds of arbitration in India, no judicial authority 
shall intervene except as provided in the Act itself.”2 But, paradoxically 
in any arbitral system, public courts may play a major role at various 
stages of a dispute: before the arbitration, during the arbitration, and 
even after an award has been rendered. Therefore, an absolute alienation 
of arbitration from the national courts is almost impossible. This is very 
much evident from the statistics of pre- and post-arbitration litigation 
brought before Indian courts. As such, certain questions relating to 
the conflict of laws, especially the issue of supervisory, or supportive, 
jurisdiction in international arbitration have become subjects of intense 
judicial debate.
I. The Nature of the Problem
Since the ratification of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 
(“the Act”), many provisions have been the subject of constant judi-
cial disagreement. The actual difficulty originated from the reading of 
Section 2 (2),3 which outlines the scope of applicability of Part I of the 
Act. Judges have supplied unusual interpretations due to a deficiency in 
the definition of the scope. The conflicting views were about the appli-
cation of Part I with respect to ICA in instances where the place of arbi-
tration is outside India.4 This conflict existed in various high courts in 
2  See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, inDia CODe § 5 (1996), 
available at http://indiacode.nic.in. 
3  See id. at §2 (stating that “this Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in 
India.”).
4  See, e.g., Marriott International Inc. v. Ansal Hotels Ltd., A.I.R. 2000 Del. 377 
(DB) (endorsing the view that Part I of the Act would apply only to arbitrations where 
the place of arbitration is in India); Dominant Offset Pvt. Ltd. v. Adamouske Strojirny 
AS, (1997) 68 D.L.T. 157 (Delhi) (holding that the provision does not exclude the 
applicability of Part I to those arbitrations which are not being held in India); Olex 
Focas Pvt. Ltd. v. Skodaexport Company Ltd., AIR 2000 Del.161 (Delhi). But see 
East Coast Shipping v. M.J Scrap, (1997) 1 Cal HN 444 (holding that Part I of the Act 
would apply only to arbitrations held in India). 
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India until the Supreme Court intervened with their decision in Bhatia 
International v. Bulk Trading SA.5 Therein, the Court held that, “Part 
I of the Act would also apply to international commercial arbitrations 
held outside India, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, 
excluded all or any of its provisions.”6 However, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation went against the mandatory language of Section 2(2) of 
the Act. The reasoning of the court, inter alia, included the view that 
the omission of the word ‘only’ makes Part I applicable to arbitrations 
seated in a foreign territory, which clearly deviated from the corre-
sponding Model Law provision.7 This statement of law by the Supreme 
Court has resulted in Indian courts taking an unconventional path with 
respect to the supervisory jurisdiction in cases of international arbitra-
tion. Moreover, the decision has raised several concerns among the 
international trading community, raising an impression of Indian hostil-
ity toward international commercial arbitration.
A. The Principle of Implied Exclusion
The post-Bhatia decisions dealt with the doctrine of ‘implied exclu-
sion’ exploring different criteria to determine the applicability of the 
Act with respect to the supervisory role of national courts in foreign 
seated arbitrations. Generally, the courts were reluctant to hold that Part 
I of the Act was inapplicable even when the seat was outside India or 
where the substantive law of contract was foreign law.8 However, in a num-
ber of cases, the courts took a pro-arbitration stance and held that “the parties had
impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of Indian courts and the application 
of Part I of the Act.”9 Although the courts could not arrive at a fixed 
formula to apply the implied exclusion principle afforded by Bhatia, 
the courts never relied on the ‘selection of a foreign seat’ as a refer-
ence point, to prevent the overreach of Indian judiciary in an offshore 
arbitration.
5  (2002) 4 SCC 105.
6  Id.
7  See Art. 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law: “The provisions of this Law, except 
articles 8, 9, 17, 32, and 36, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of 
the State.”
8  See Citation Info Wares Ltd. v. Equinox Corporation, (2009) 7 SCC 220; see also 
INDTEL Technical Services v. W S Atkins Pvt Ltd (2008) 10 SCC 308.
9 See, e.g., Max India Ltd v. General Binding Corporation, 2009 (3) Arb LR 162 
(Delhi).
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There have been certain instances in the post-Bhatia era where courts 
were willing to accept the argument that the parties had opted out of the 
application of the Act. However, in these instances, courts have applied 
varying criteria. For example, in Hardy Oil and Gas Ltd. v. Hindustan
Oil Exploration Co. Ltd.,10 Indian law and English law governed the 
main contract and arbitration agreement respectively. In this case, the 
arbitration was to be conducted according to the rules of the London 
Court of International Arbitration in England. The Gujarat High Court 
held that Part I was to be impliedly excluded because the parties had 
expressly chosen English law as the curial law of arbitration. Later, the 
Supreme Court came close to accepting the well-established seat theory 
of international arbitration11 in Dozco India v. Doosan Infracore Co. 
Ltd.12 However, it missed the opportunity in clearing up the anomalous 
situation. In the case of Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India,13 
the agreement provided for Indian law to be the proper law of contract 
and English law as the law of arbitration. The Court held that, by vir-
tue of English law being the curial law, Part I was excluded. In Yograj
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Ltd,14 
the agreement provided for the rules of the Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre as the procedural soft law for arbitration seated in 
Singapore. The Court held that Part I was excluded even though the par-
ties had expressly stated that the substantive law of the contract would 
be Indian law. However, the confusion caused by the Bhatia decision 
was exacerbated and resulted in labelling India as an anti-arbitration 
jurisdiction when the Supreme Court annulled a foreign award in its 
decision Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services
10  Hardy Oil and Gas Ltd. v. Hindustan Oil Exploration Co., (2006) I.L.R (Guj.) 
658.
11  See also FA Mann, ‘Lex Facit Arbitrum’ in International Arbitration – Liber 
Amicorum for Martin Domke, P. Sanders (ed.) (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1967). 
12  M/S Dozco India P. Ltd. v. M/S Doosan Infracore Co. (2011) 6 S.C.C. 179 (India) 
(holding that “[i]n the absence of express agreement, there is a strong prima facie 
presumption that the parties intend the curial law to be the law of the ‘seat’ of the 
arbitration on the ground that, it is that country, which is most closely connected with 
the proceedings”) (citing Michael Mustill & Stewart Boyd, The law anD pRaCTiCe OF 
COmmeRCial aRbiTRaTiOn in englanD (2nd ed. 1989)).
13  Videocon Indus. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 S.C.C. 161 (India).
14  Yograj Infrastrusture Ltd. v. Ssangyong Eng’g & Constrr. Ltd., (2011) 9 S.C.C. 
735 (India).
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Ltd.15 Pursuant Venture Global, an Indian court could hear challenges to 
a foreign arbitration award under Section 34 of Part I of the Act.
II. Judicial Treatment for the Ailment
On January 10, 2012, a five judge constitution bench of the Supreme
Court started its proceedings in the case of Bharat Aluminium Co. v. 
Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc. (hereinafter BALCO).16 The 
Court reconsidered the controversial rulings in Bhatia and Venture 
Global pertaining to the scope of extra territorial application of Part I 
of the Act.17 The Court affirmed that the Act adopted the territoriality 
principle of the Model Law and accepted existing theories in interna-
tional arbitration on Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention (“the 
NY Convention”).18 The case involved several appeals dealing with 
the same, broader legal issue: whether the Indian courts can perform 
supervisory jurisdiction in arbitrations seated outside the country. The 
Supreme Court of India gave the answer in the negative. Essentially, 
the decision meant that the Indian courts could no longer make interim 
orders, remove or appoint arbitrators in arbitrations with seats outside or 
entertain annulment challenges to foreign arbitration awards.19 The fol-
lowing sections address certain pertinent issues relating to this broader 
legal question.
A. Silence and the Implication of License
The Court in BALCO deliberated in detail upon the significance of 
the missing word “only” in section 2(2). The word “only” would not 
have been significant had it not been used in Article 1(2) of the Model 
Law. The senior counsel for appellants contended that, since “only” is 
absent from the provision, the applicability of the Act is automatically 
15  Venture Global Eng’g v. Satyam Comp. Services Ltd., (2008) 4 S.C.C. 190 (India).
16  Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Serv. Inc., Civil Appeal 
No.7019 of 2005 available at http://www.sci.nic.in/outtoday/ac701905p.pdf.
17  See Karan S. Tyagi, A Second Look at International Arbitration, The Hindu (Dec. 
11, 2011), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2735659.ece?homepage=true 
(last visited on 01/02/2013).
18  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 
5, 10 June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S 4739.
19  Umer Akram Choudhary, Marking their Territory: Bharat Aluminum v. 
Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services, Wolters Kluwer (Sep. 13, 2012), http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/09/13/marking-their-territory-bharat-
aluminum-v-kaiser-aluminum-technical-services-2012/.
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extended to foreign arbitrations as well. The relevant question was 
whether the omission expresses the intention of the Indian Parliament 
to widen the applicability of Part I of the Act to arbitrations outside 
India. Rejecting this proposition, the Court held the omission of “only” 
in Section 2(2) of the Act does not indicate that Indian courts could 
supervise arbitration proceedings taking place outside India. Rather, 
the Court determined that the Act adopted a scheme different from the 
Model Law in this respect. In Article 1(2) of the Model Law, it was 
necessary to include the word “only” to clarify that, except for certain 
provisions, the Model Law would be applicable on strictly territorial 
basis. The exceptions stipulated in Article 1(2) of the Model Law were 
not enumerated in Section 2(2) of the Act, and therefore, the word 
“only” would have been superfluous there.20
B. The Center of Gravity of Arbitral Process and the Seat 
Theory
A critical issue in any international arbitration is the location of 
the arbitral seat and the territoriality thesis. A major part of the judg-
ment deals with the territoriality principle that forms the conceptual 
basis for Article 1(2) of the Model Law. Accordingly, the territoriality 
principle holds that the Model Law would only apply where the place 
of arbitration was in the contracting State. In most legal systems, the 
arbitration law of a state is territorial in scope, regulating arbitration 
proceedings that have their seat within the territory of that state and 
not the foreign arbitrations. In the Court’s decision in BALCO, the 
Court affirmed that the Act adopted the territoriality principle of the 
Model Law, which is abundantly clear from the scheme of the Act.21 The 
application of Part I is, therefore, restricted to arbitrations taking place 
in India. To quote from the Preamble of the Act itself, “[t]he seat of 
arbitration is intended to be the central point or its center of gravity.”22 
Recognizing this principle to be applicable in the Indian context as well, 
the Court in BALCO endorsed one of the most fundamental concepts of 
international arbitration law.
On the other hand, the delocalization debate has certainly influenced 
and fuelled a movement away from the control of the domestic courts 
20  See Tyagi, supra note 17. 
21  See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Preamble, No. 26 of 1996, India Code.
22  See Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 4th ed. 2004).
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at the place of arbitration.23 This form of delocalized arbitration can 
be practiced only if the state and its laws permit it. Here, the Court 
clearly identified the fact that Indian law does not recognize delocalized 
arbitration proceedings. If the parties have not selected the law govern-
ing the conduct of arbitration, the law of the seat of arbitration governs 
the arbitration proceedings as it is “most closely connected with the 
proceedings.”24 Therefore, by agreeing to a seat or place of arbitration 
outside of India, the parties choose the laws of the seat of arbitration to 
govern the conduct of arbitrations. This is an issue of party autonomy 
and the Act allows parties to opt out of it by choosing the seat of arbitra-
tion in another country.
C. Enforcement and Annulment
The delocalized view separates the existence of award from the 
law of the country of origin or place of arbitration, by challenging the 
premise that any legal activity occuring within the territory is governed 
by the law of that country. However, the NY Convention tries to strike 
a balance between these two views by putting Article V(1)(e) in the 
text.25 The Indian Parliament has adopted this provision in the form of 
Section 48(1)(e). The Supreme Court in BALCO correctly identified 
the ambiguity existing in this provision and held that the correct 
interpretation of Article V(1)(e) of the NY Convention is that an award 
can be challenged in “the country, under the law of which the award 
was made” only if the annulment action in “the country in which the 
award was made” is not available. The Court further specified that the 
terms “under the law” in Article V(1)(e) refer to the procedural law of 
arbitration proceedings rather than the substantive law of arbitration.26 
Therefore, an annulment action could only be brought in the country 
“under the law of which the award was made” in the rare situation where 
23  See Otto Sandrock, To Continue Nationalizing or to De-Nationalize? That is Now 
the Question in International Arbitration, 12 am. Rev. inT’l aRb. 301 (2001).
24  See Bharat Aluminum Co., Civil Appeal No. 7019 of 2005, ¶ 105 (citing Albert 
Dicey and John Morris, The Conflict of Laws (Stevens & Sons eds. 11th ed. 1987)); 
also see supra note 9.
25 Article V 1(e) says that enforcement of a New York Convention award can be 
refused where it “has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”
26  See Bharat Aluminum Co., Civil Appeal No. 7019 of 2005, ¶ 153 (citing Int’l 
Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745 
F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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parties have agreed upon a procedural law other than that of the arbitral 
seat.27
ConClusion
The BALCO judgment, undoubtedly, is a restatement of interna-
tional commercial arbitration law as envisaged under the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act of 1996. This well-researched decision brought in 
conceptual clarity and straightened out certain contentious issues that 
existed for a long time, by declaring that Part I and Part II of the Act 
are mutually exclusive. However, there are still certain issues that need 
to be clarified because the Indian Supreme Court took a ‘hands-off ’ 
approach by declining to “fill up the void” that existed in the arbitration 
regime.
I. Interim Measures
The Supreme Court categorically declared that Part I of the Act can-
not be applied in an arbitration seated abroad. Thus, no party can make 
an application to a court in India for interim measures of protection 
under Section 9 of the Act (which comes under Part I). This decision 
puts the parties in a more dangerous situation than the Bhatia regime, 
where they had the freedom of opting out of all or some of the provisions 
of Part I. Read in the context of interim measures, the Bhatia rationale 
retained the freedom of the parties to approach the Indian courts under 
Section 9, unless it is excluded. Hence, the parties are now left remedi-
less, as far as the interim relief is concerned, if the choice of seat is in 
a foreign country. Nevertheless, this verdict may prove to be a positive 
step as far as India’s dream to become a hub of international arbitration, 
because it is now mandatory to select an Indian seat to obtain an interim 
remedy from the court.
II. Prospective Overruling
Though the judgment has generally been received positively by 
the international arbitration community, there remains some reserva-
tions particularly with respect to the prospective overruling element of 
the decision. The concern arises from the fact that this decision will 
apply only to arbitration agreements which are concluded on or after 
27  Id. at ¶ 149 (citing Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Chapter 21, 
(Kluwer Law International eds. 3d ed. 2009).
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September 6, 2012.28 The logical implication is that the courts in India 
still have the option of exercising their long arm jurisdiction to offshore 
arbitrations, with respect to arbitration agreements executed prior to 
this date. Given the existence of litigations pending in various Indian 
courts, this is likely to become a contentious issue in the near future as it 
envisages the creation of two parallel regimes. There will be anomalous 
situations when courts supervising arbitrations decide the matter either 
according to Bhatia doctrine or BALCO rationale depending on the date 
of formation of the arbitration agreement. However, the court’s decision 
to apply the BALCO rationale only prospectively, can also be seen as an 
effort to balance the interests of the parties and avoid the miscarriage 
of justice by entirely washing away the possibility of an interim remedy. 
Nevertheless, the arbitration enthusiasts will have to wait and see how 
the Indian judges maintain these two parallel regimes in future.
28  Id. at ¶ 200.
